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I.   INTRODUCTION
 There is no doubt that discrimination is still deeply rooted in our 
society.1 Although discrimination in any form is despicable, discrimi-
nation in the workplace has potentially negative ramifications on a 
person’s career, job performance, and ability to earn a living.2
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII), the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) were passed by Congress starting in the mid-1900s to combat 
workplace discrimination.3 Since then, employment discrimination 
litigation has become commonplace in our legal system.4 It is well set-
tled that if the employer’s formal decisionmaker discriminates 
against an employee then unlawful employment discrimination has 
occurred.5 However, it is less clear whether discrimination by a sub-
ordinate, who influences the decisionmaker’s determination to termi-
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 1. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 1997
THROUGH FY 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visit-
ed Mar. 18, 2011) (showing that for the 2009 fiscal year, 36% of the claims filed with the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) were based on race, 36% of the 
claims were based on retaliation, 30% of the claims were based on sex, 24.4% of the claims 
were based on age, 23% of the claims were based on disability, 11.9% of the claims were 
based on national origin, and 3.6% of the claims were based on religion). In 2009, more 
than 93,000 employment discrimination claims were filed with the EEOC. Id. This is up 
from about 77,000 only ten years earlier. Id. 
 2. Keaton Wong, Comment, Weighing Influence: Employment Discrimination and the 
Theory of Subordinate Bias Liability, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1729, 1730 (2008). 
 3. Taran S. Kaler, Comment, Controlling the Cat’s Paw: Circuit Split Concerning the 
Level of Control a Biased Subordinate Must Exert Over the Formal Decisionmaker’s Choice 
to Terminate, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069, 1069-70 (2008). 
 4. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2011) (showing the number of employment discrimination cases litigated 
from 1997 until 2009). 
 5. Wong, supra note 2, at 1730-31. 
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nate, qualifies as employment discrimination.6 This is known as sub-
ordinate bias liability. Although all United States Courts of Appeal 
recognize subordinate bias liability, the circuits are split as to what 
standard of control should be applied when assessing this liability.7
 Subordinate bias liability “impute[s] the discriminatory bias of a 
subordinate, who lacks the formal authority to terminate an employ-
ee, to the decisionmaker who does have formal authority to termi-
nate.”8 This theory of liability is derived from agency principles. Both 
Title VII and the ADEA use the United States Code’s definition of 
employer, which is “a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce . . . and any agent of such a person.”9
 In cat’s paw cases, although the formal decisionmaker does not dis-
criminate against the employee, the discriminatory animus of the sub-
ordinate causes the employer to be liable under federal antidiscrimina-
tion statutes.10 The circuits are split as to how much influence the sub-
ordinate must exhibit over the decisionmaker’s determination to ter-
minate to invoke subordinate bias liability. Some circuits apply a leni-
ent standard while other circuits apply a much stricter standard.11
 The Supreme Court will hear the case Staub v. Proctor Hospital
during its 2010 term to determine a uniform standard of control for 
subordinate bias liability cases.12 This Note will analyze the current 
standards amongst the circuits, predict which standard the Supreme 
Court will announce as the uniform standard, and examine how that 
standard will affect the outcome of Staub.
II.   BACKGROUND
A.   Cat’s Paw Doctrine 
 Judge Posner was the first to dub subordinate bias liability as the 
“cat’s-paw” doctrine in Shager v. Upjohn Co.13 The cat’s paw principle 
derives from a fable, The Monkey and the Cat by Jean LaFontaine, in 
which a monkey convinces a gullible cat to pull chestnuts from a hot 
fire.14 The cat snatches them from the fire, each time burning its paw, 
only to find that the monkey has eaten all of the chestnuts.15 Today 
                                                                                                                                        
 6. Id. at 1731. 
 7. Kaler, supra note 3, at 1070. 
 8. Id.
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) 
(ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (Title VII). 
 10. Kaler, supra note 3, at 1070. 
 11. Wong, supra note 2, at 1732-33. 
 12. 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010).  
 13. 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 14. Rachel Santoro, Narrowing the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for a Uniform Subordi-
nate Bias Liability Standard, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 823, 824 n.3 (2009). 
 15. Sean Ratliff, Comment, Independent Investigations: An Inequitable Out for Em-
ployers in Cat’s Paw Cases, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 258 (2009). 
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“cat’s paw” is “used to describe a person who is unwittingly manipulated 
by another to accomplish his purposes.”16 Particularly with subordinate 
bias liability, the monkey is the person who convinces the decisionmak-
er, the cat, to unknowingly engage in employment discrimination.17
B.   Staub v. Proctor Hospital 
 The case before the Supreme Court in the 2010 term, Staub, final-
ly allows the Court to determine the circumstances under which an 
employer may be held liable based on the unlawful discriminatory 
intent of subordinates who caused or influenced, but did not make, 
the final termination decision.18
 Vincent Staub, the petitioner, was a member of the United States 
Army Reserve and was employed by Proctor Hospital, the respond-
ent, as an angiography technologist (angio tech) in the Diagnostic 
Imaging Department.19 Staub contended his supervisor, Janice Mu-
lally, and coworker, Angie Day, had antimilitary animus because 
Staub required time off from work due to his Army Reserve training 
schedule and duties.20 Mulally switched Staub’s work schedule to in-
terfere with drills, called his training “bullshit,” and made state-
ments that Staub’s reserve duties were a burden on the other em-
ployees.21 Day had similar feelings towards Staub and his military 
commitments, and she criticized him to the department.22
 Staub’s termination was prompted by two separate incidents. 
First, on January 26, 2004, Mulally issued Staub a written warning 
for failing to assist with general diagnostics when not in the an-
giography lab.23 However, there was never a rule that obligated  
Staub to assist with general diagnostics when not in the angiography 
lab.24 Staub reported only signing the warning “to get [Mulally] off of 
his back.”25 After signing it, the warning became part of his record 
along with the instructions to report to Mulally or Korenchuk when 
                                                                                                                                        
 16. Mario A. Barrera & Amy Karff Halevy, Understanding The “Cat’s Paw” Doctrine in the 
Employment Context, BRACEWELL & GIULIANI (May 14, 2007), 
http://www.bracewellgiuliani.com/index.cfm/fa/news.advisory/item/424a4364-9a6a-4133-b091-
6abdbe2eed82/Understanding_The_Cats_Paw_Doctrine_in_the_Employment_Context.cfm. 
 17. Ratliff, supra note 15, at 258. 
 18. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 
2009) (Nos. 08-1316, 08-2255, 08-2402), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2009) (No. 09-400). 
 19. Id. at 3-4; Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Staub, 560 
F.3d 647 (Nos. 08-1316, 08-2255, 08-2402).  
 20. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 4-6. 
 21. Staub, 560 F.3d at 651-52.  
 22. Id. at 652. 
 23. Id. at 653. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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he was not busy with his angio tech duties or when he wanted to 
leave the diagnostic area.26
 The second incident occurred on April 20, 2004, the day Staub was 
fired, when he left the diagnostic area without permission.27 Unable 
to find Korenchuk before leaving for lunch, Staub left Korenchuk a 
voicemail to inform him of his whereabouts.28 Staub and a coworker 
were only gone for thirty minutes;29 however, Korenchuk told Linda 
Buck, the formal decisionmaker, he was unable to find Staub all 
morning.30 When Staub returned from lunch, he was escorted to 
Buck’s office where he was handed a pink slip terminating his em-
ployment.31 Buck based her decision to terminate Staub on Koren-
chuk’s report, past incidents, and a review of Staub’s personnel file.32
She failed to contact any current angio techs and did not investigate 
Staub’s assertions that Mulally wanted him fired.33 Staub’s military 
involvement was arguably not a factor in her decisionmaking.34
 Staub claimed employment discrimination against Proctor under 
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
of 1984 (USERRA), which “prohibit[s] discrimination against persons 
because of their service in the uniformed services.”35 He argued that 
the cat’s paw doctrine was applicable in this case because the prior 
warnings and complaints in his personnel file were results of Mulal-
ly’s prejudices.36 Therefore, Staub argued that Proctor Hospital was 
liable for employment discrimination because the decisionmaker, 
Buck, was influenced by her subordinate’s discriminatory animus.37
 Although a jury found that Staub was terminated because of his 
military affiliation,38 the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that “Buck 
took this action free of any military-based animus” and a reasonable 
jury could not find that Staub was terminated because of his  
military service.39
                                                                                                                                        
 26. Id. 
 27. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
 28. Staub, 560 F.3d at 654. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 9. 
 31. Staub, 560 F.3d at 654. 
 32. Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Staub, 560 F.3d 
647 (Nos. 08-1316, 08-2255, 08-2402). 
 33. Staub, 560 F.3d at 654-55. 
 34. Id. at 655. 
 35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 3; 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(3) (2006). 
 36. Staub, 560 F.3d at 655. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 651. 
 39. Id. at 659. 
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III.   THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CONTINUUM
 As previously stated, all circuits acknowledge subordinate bias as 
a means to impute liability to the employer in employment discrimi-
nation cases; however, there is no uniform standard as to what cir-
cumstances invoke subordinate bias liability.40 Each circuit has de-
termined for itself what standard should be applied leaving a contin-
uum of standards from very strict to lenient.41 The Fourth Circuit 
adopted the strictest standard by far, almost eliminating subordinate 
bias liability except in a very narrow set of cases.42 The intermediate 
standard has been adopted by the Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Elev-
enth Circuits.43 The remaining circuits—the First, Second, Third, 
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia—have adopted varia-
tions of the lenient standard.44
 The language in Title VII creates ambiguity as to which standard 
should apply in cat’s paw cases. Title VII was founded on agency 
principles and states that “an unlawful employment practice is estab-
lished when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any em-
ployment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice.”45 The Supreme Court has consistently used “but-for” and proxi-
mate causation standards in agency cases; however the “motivating 
factor” language for subordinate bias liability suggests that a but-for 
causation requirement is not necessary.46 By adopting varying stand-
ards, circuits are individually determining what level of causation 
the bias subordinate must have in cat’s paw cases.47
A.   Strict Standard 
 The Fourth Circuit has adopted the strictest standard for deter-
mining how much control a subordinate must have over the formal 
decisionmaker for the employer to be held liable.48 In Hill v. Lockheed 
Martin Logistics Management, Inc., Ethel Louise Hill, a fifty-seven 
year old female, worked as an aircraft mechanic at a military base for 
                                                                                                                                        
 40. Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat’s Paw: Delineating 
the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C.
L. REV. 383, 385-86 (2008).  
 41. See id. at 386. 
 42. Kaler, supra note 3, at 1079. 
 43. See Wong, supra note 2, at 1745. 
 44. Id. at 1740-41. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 46. Sara Eber, Comment, How Much Power Should Be in the Paw? Independent Inves-
tigations and the Cat’s Paw Doctrine, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 149-50 (2008). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Kaler, supra note 3, at 1078. 
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Lockheed Martin.49 Thomas Prickett, a manager, and Archie Griffin, 
a senior supervisor, were both superiors of Hill at Lockheed.50 Neither 
spent much time at the military base.51 At the base, Hill reported to a 
“lead person,” who, in turn, reported to Griffin.52 There was also a 
safety inspector, Ed Fultz, who ensured the mechanics’ work was in 
accordance with safety protocol.53 However, Fultz did not have any 
supervisory authority over Hill or the other mechanics and reported 
to the lead person.54
 Hill filed suit against Lockheed for wrongful discharge based on 
her sex and age, violating Title VII and the ADEA.55 She alleged that 
“Fultz harbored discriminatory bias against her, calling her such 
names as ‘useless old lady,’ ‘troubled old lady,’ and ‘damn woman.’ ”56
According to Hill, Fultz’s animus toward her resulted in unsubstan-
tiated reports which were the basis of Prickett’s and Griffin’s decision 
to terminate her employment.57 She contended that the cat’s paw doc-
trine applies because Fultz’s discriminatory animus substantially 
influenced the decisionmakers in their determination.58
 The Fourth Circuit recognized subordinate bias liability as a 
means to bring an employment discrimination action but severely 
narrowed its applicability.59 Relying on agency principles for its deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit held that prior case law “defined the limits of 
such agency as encompassing employer liability for the acts of its 
employees holding supervisory or other actual power to make tangi-
ble employment decisions.”60 Therefore, since the formal decision-
makers were without discriminatory animus and Fultz did not have a 
supervisory position, Lockheed was not held liable for employment 
discrimination.61 “[I]n the Fourth Circuit, the biased subordinate has 
to be the supervisor or in a managerial-capacity position over the 
                                                                                                                                        
 49. 354 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 50. Id.
 51. Id.
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 282-83. 
 54. Id. at 282. 
 55. Id. Hill had received three written reprimands, including a suspension, from two 
separate lead people—Ronald Saunders and Richard Dixon—after getting reports from 
Fultz about faulty work. Id. According to company policy, “[a]n employee who receives a 
combination of two written reprimands not involving a suspension and one involving a 
suspension . . . will be subject to discharge.” Id. Dixon, a lead person, reported to Prickett 
and Griffin, who were the formal decisionmakers in Hill’s termination. Id. 
 56. Kaler, supra note 3, at 1078 (quoting Hill, 354 F.3d at 283). 
 57. Hill, 354 F.3d at 283. 
 58. See id.
 59. See Wong, supra note 2, at 1744. 
 60. Hill, 354 F.3d at 287. 
 61. Id. at 297-98. 
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terminated employee and must be ‘principally responsible’ for the 
formal decisionmaker’s decision to terminate the employee.”62
 In his dissent, Judge Michael claimed that this decision “renders 
Title VII and the ADEA essentially toothless when it comes to pro-
tecting employees against unlawful employment decisions that are 
motivated by biased subordinates.”63 He noted that this decision is at 
odds with subordinate bias liability theories in the other circuits.64
B.   Intermediate Standard 
 The Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted stand-
ards that fall along the middle of the continuum. Under the interme-
diate approach, a causal connection must exist between the subordi-
nate’s bias and the decision to terminate the employee.65 The land-
mark case for this standard is the Tenth Circuit case, EEOC v. BCI 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles.66 In this case, Stephen Peters 
was an African-American employee at BCI in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, where 60% of the employees were Hispanic and less than 2% 
of the employees were African-American.67 Peters’ district sales man-
ager was Cesar Grado, who was Hispanic; however, Jeff Katt, who 
was Caucasian, supervised Peters daily.68 Grado’s duties included 
monitoring the employees under him, but he had no authority to 
terminate any employees.69 Grado was responsible for bringing any 
problems to the attention of the Human Resources Department 
(HR)—Sherry Pederson and Pat Edgar.70
 Peters claimed BCI wrongfully terminated him under the Title VII 
cat’s paw theory.71 He argued that Grado discriminated against him 
because he was African-American.72 BCI could have argued that be-
                                                                                                                                        
 62. Kaler, supra note 3, at 1079 (quoting Hill, 354 F.3d at 291). 
 63. Hill, 354 F.3d at 301 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Wong, supra note 2, at 1745. 
 66. 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007). 
 67. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 478. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 478-79. 
 71. Id. at 482. Peters worked a typical workweek—Monday through Friday. Id. at 478. 
Grado was responsible for scheduling and had Katts inform Peters that he needed to cover 
an extra shift on a Sunday. Id. at 479. Peters informed Katts that he had previous plans 
and would not be able to work that day. Id. Katts allegedly told Grado that Peters was not 
able to work and would call in sick. Id. It is disputed whether Peters actually said he would 
call in sick. Id. After that conversation, Grado called Edgar in HR stating that Peters re-
fused to come in on Sunday and planned to call in sick. Id. Edgar told Grado to find out 
why Peters would not work on Sunday, and if there was no “compelling reason” then Pe-
ters’ failure to go to work on Sunday would be treated as insubordination and grounds for 
termination. Id. When Grado confronted Peters, Peters said that his plans were “none of 
[Mr. Grado’s] business.” Id. Grado told Edgar about the conversation, and Edgar decided to 
terminate Peters’ employment. Id. at 480.
 72. Id. at 482. 
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cause Grado was only the messenger and not the formal deci-
sionmaker, BCI could not be held liable.73 Edgar, the formal deci-
sionmaker, had never met Peters and was not aware of his race when 
she made the decision to terminate him.74 The Tenth Circuit, howev-
er, forged a new path for determining cat’s paw liability and sided  
with Peters.75
 The Tenth Circuit rejected both the Fourth Circuit’s strict stand-
ard and the lenient standard of other circuits.76 The court decided 
that in order to succeed on a cat’s paw theory, “a plaintiff must estab-
lish more than mere ‘influence’ or ‘input’ in the decision-making pro-
cess. Rather, the issue is whether the biased subordinate’s discrimi-
natory reports, recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse 
employment action.”77 Therefore, a causal connection between the 
subordinate’s discrimination and the formal decisionmaker’s decision 
to terminate the employee must exist.78 Like other causal standards, 
the employer is able to break the chain of causation.79 By inde-
pendently investigating allegations against an employee, the employ-
er can avoid liability under the cat’s paw theory.80 BCI petitioned for 
a writ for certiorari, which was granted, but the case settled before 
the Supreme Court could hear the case.81
 The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have also adopted simi-
lar causal approaches to determining liability under the cat’s paw 
theory.82 In Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Sixth Circuit stat-
ed that a plaintiff “must offer evidence that the supervisor’s racial 
animus was the cause of the termination or somehow influenced the 
ultimate decisionmaker.”83 In Brewer v. Board of Trustees of the Uni-
versity of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit reiterated its standard that an 
employer is liable under the cat’s paw theory only if a subordinate 
was the “singular influence” over an adverse employment decision so 
as to make the subordinate the “functional[] . . . decision-maker.”84 The
                                                                                                                                        
 73. Id. at 484. 
 74. Id.
 75. Id. at 487-88, 493. 
 76. See Wong, supra note 2, at 1749, 1752. 
 77. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 487. 
 78. Kaler, supra note 3, at 1083. 
 79. Befort & Olig, supra note 40, at 396. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See 549 U.S. 1334 (2007); U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PRESS RELEASE,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-15-08.cfm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
 82. See, e.g., Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 917 (7th Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 357 (2007); Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 
877 (6th Cir. 2001); Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 83. 252 F.3d at 877; see also Wilson v. Stroh Cos., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that there has to be a “causal nexus” between the biased subordinate and the for-
mal decisionmaker’s adverse employment action). 
 84. 479 F.3d at 917 (quoting Little v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 
2004)); see also Willis v. Marion Cnty. Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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Eleventh Circuit echoed a similar theory in Stimpson v. City of Tusca-
loosa.85 The plaintiff must proffer evidence that the formal decision-
maker relied on biased information or recommendations from a subor-
dinate, and that these recommendations were the actual cause of the 
employee’s wrongful termination.86 These circuits also recognize that 
the causal chain can be broken with an independent investigation.87
C.   Lenient Standard 
 The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits recognize that a subordinate’s bias can be imputed to 
the employer in cat’s paw cases if the subordinate has any influence or 
involvement in the adverse employment decision.88 Unlike the interme-
diate and strict standards of the other circuits, the circuits with a leni-
ent standard do not require a causal relationship between the subordi-
nate and decisionmaker, nor do they require the subordinate to be the 
functional decisionmaker. This standard gives the plaintiff a low thresh-
old to meet to survive the summary judgment phase in litigation.89
 Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture provides an example of the 
lenient standard.90 Sandra Russell, a fifty-four year old female, worked 
as the Director of Clinical Services at Columbia Homecare alongside 
Steve Cuilla, a twenty-eight year old male, who worked as the Director 
of Operations and was the son of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
Homecare’s parent company.91 Both Russell and Cuilla reported to 
Carol Jacobsen, their fifty-three year old supervisor.92
 Homecare fired Russell on January 27, 1997, and she filed suit 
alleging age discrimination under the ADEA the next year.93 Cuilla 
referred to Russell as an “old bitch” and other discriminatory names 
                                                                                                                                        
 85. 186 F.3d at 1331; see also Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 
1249 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 86. Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1331. “When the biased recommender and the actual deci-
sionmaker are not the same person or persons, a plaintiff may not benefit from the infer-
ence of causation that would arise from their common identity. Instead, the plaintiff must 
prove that the discriminatory animus behind the recommendation, and not the underlying 
employee misconduct identified in the recommendation, was an actual cause of the other 
party’s decision to terminate the employee.” Id. (citing Llampallas, 163 F.3d at 1248). 
 87. Befort & Olig, supra note 40, at 396. 
 88. See, e.g., Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 
F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001); Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 
286 (3d Cir. 2001); Rose v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001); Russell v. 
McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2000); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial 
P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2000); Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 
F.3d 1308, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Stacks v. Sw. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1323 
(8th Cir. 1994). 
 89. Befort & Olig, supra note 40, at 389. 
 90. See 235 F.3d at 226. 
 91. Id. at 221. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.
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so often that Russell needed earplugs to do her work without being 
bothered.94 Russell established that Cuilla, the son of the CEO, “pos-
sessed leverage” over Jacobsen, and Cuilla used that leverage so that 
Jacobsen would terminate Russell.95 Homecare asserted that because 
Cuilla was not the formal decisionmaker, his discrimination could not 
be assigned to the company.96 “The Fifth Circuit explained that the 
level of control a biased subordinate must exert for courts to hold an 
employer vicariously liable is whether the subordinate ‘possessed 
leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker.’ Thus, 
the biased subordinate could be a co-worker, supervisor, or a lower 
level worker.”97
 The remaining six circuits have also adopted similar lenient stan-
dards.98 Generally when there is any discrimination by a subordinate 
that merely influences or participates in an adverse employment de-
cision, these circuits will hold the employer liable under the cat’s paw 
doctrine.99 As a result these circuits are extremely pro-plaintiff be-
cause plaintiffs are not required to show that the subordinate’s dis-
crimination actually affected the decisionmaker’s determination  
to terminate.100
IV.   WHAT WILL SCOTUS DO?
 The Staub case provides the ideal opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to proclaim a uniform standard. The Supreme Court should 
adopt the intermediate causation standard because it is the only 
standard that balances the interests of both employees and employ-
ers as intended by Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.101
 The lenient standard in cat’s paw cases provides too low of a 
threshold for liability by essentially guaranteeing that any discrimi-
nation by an employee of the company will be imputed to the employ-
er.102 Circuits that have adopted the lenient standard interpret the 
“motivating factor” language of Title VII broadly—hardly requiring 
any causation between the discrimination by a subordinate and the 
adverse employment action by the decisionmaker.103 With such a low 
threshold to impute liability, plaintiffs are almost ensured survival 
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through the summary judgment phase because there is a higher like-
lihood of presenting a genuine issue of material fact.104
 Besides providing too low of a threshold of liability, which increas-
es litigation, the lenient standard also does not conform to the poli-
cies and principles of Title VII.105 Title VII was enacted to prevent 
discriminatory practices from occurring in the workplace by control-
ling employees’ behavior.106 It is founded on agency principles, which 
hold employers liable for actions of their employees, even if the ac-
tions are not within the scope of the employee’s duties.107 By having 
such a broad and encompassing standard, employers are being held 
liable for actions of their employees that they had no control over and 
could not prevent.108 Therefore, employers are left open to liability 
regardless of the antidiscrimination and antiharassment policies 
they put in place.109
 At the other extreme, the strict standard limits liability so much 
that the plaintiff has an enormous burden to satisfy to pass summary 
judgment. Although this standard takes causation principles into ac-
count, most agree that it is far too restrictive as represented by the 
fact that every circuit but the Fourth Circuit had adopted a more  
lenient standard.110
 As stated previously, Title VII relies on agency principles, which 
refer to any “agent” of the employer, not just the formal decision-
maker.111 This strict standard shields the employer from liability if 
the employer can show that the discrimination came from someone 
other than the one “principally responsible” for the adverse employ-
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ment decision.112 This standard ignores the principles of Title VII by 
severely limiting the agents of the employer that can be responsible 
for imputed discrimination.113 If that were the standard used by all 
circuits then employers would have no incentive for preventing dis-
criminatory practices in the workplace because they would essential-
ly be immune from liability.114
 The intermediate causation standard creates a balance between 
holding employers liable for adverse employment decisions based on 
discrimination using the agency principles of Title VII while also 
providing plaintiffs an avenue for redress if they are adversely affect-
ed by discrimination.115 The intermediate standard provides plaintiffs 
protection from discriminatory practices “by not allowing employers 
to hide behind a shield of unbiased decision-makers.”116 Most im-
portantly it takes into account the realities of the workplace. Alt-
hough a formal decisionmaker terminates an employee, the causation 
standard recognizes the authority that supervisors have over em-
ployees but does so without blindly imputing liability to  
the employer.117
 When defining the intermediate causation standard, the Supreme 
Court should use the “motivating factor” language of Title VII.118 If 
the Court decides that a biased subordinate must be a “motivating 
factor” in the adverse employment decision, it will be clear that this 
standard complies with the policies and principles of Title VII. In an 
earlier employment discrimination decision, the Supreme Court stat-
ed that “a plaintiff need only present sufficient [direct or circumstan-
tial] evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice.’ ”119 The Court should 
extend this reasoning to subordinate bias liability cases. This word-
ing not only ensures that some causal link exists between a biased 
subordinate and an adverse employment action by the decisionmak-
er, but it also allows for the realities of workplace dynamics to be 
taken into account. 
 Like other causal relationship standards, this one can be limited 
by breaking the chain of causation.120 Employers will be encouraged 
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to conduct independent investigations to determine that a termina-
tion decision, or other recommendations and reports, were made free 
of discriminatory bias.121 Once this determination is made, the inde-
pendent investigation would break the chain of causation limiting 
any potential liability.122
The intermediate option provides the best equilibrium between em-
ployers and employees battling discrimination in the workplace. Em-
ployers are held liable when there is subordinate discrimination, but 
they are able to limit their liability by conducting independent investi-
gations, and employees have a judicial means to redress any adverse 
employment decisions that were not properly investigated. This also 
assures that there is some type of causation standard, without it being 
too broad or too restricting, in accordance with Title VII.  
V.   THE FUTURE STAUB DECISION
 If the Supreme Court applies the intermediate causation standard 
to Staub, Proctor Hospital will be found liable for employment dis-
crimination under USERRA. The jury found that Staub was termi-
nated because of his military affiliation; however, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed the jury’s decision because the evidence of Staub’s supervi-
sor’s discriminatory animus was wrongly admitted since there lacked 
a “singular influence” over Buck’s decision to terminate Staub.123 Un-
der the new standard, a “singular influence” does not need to influ-
ence the decisionmaker. The Seventh Circuit’s standard is closest to 
the strict standard. If the Court adopts a standard that requires the 
subordinate to be the “motivating factor,” then the standard will be 
more lenient than the “singular influence” standard. In Staub’s case, 
the jury found enough evidence to link Proctor Hospital to the dis-
criminatory animus of Staub’s supervisor, Mullaly, rendering Proctor 
Hospital liable under the cat’s paw doctrine.124
 Proctor Hospital will likely contend that Buck’s (the decisionmak-
er) independent investigation broke the chain of causation. However, 
Buck’s decision to terminate was largely based on her recollection of 
past issues with Staub and a review of Staub’s personnel file, which 
contained past incident reports that were caused by Mulally’s bias.125
In addition, Buck failed to speak to any of Staub’s coworkers or to 
investigate Staub’s belief that Mulally was out to get him.126 The
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Court will likely determine that this does not qualify as an adequate 
investigation to break the chain of causation.127
 Therefore, without an adequate independent investigation, Proc-
tor Hospital will be liable under the intermediate standard because 
Mulally was the motivating factor in Buck’s termination decision. 
VI.   CONCLUSION
 The Supreme Court, through Staub, has the opportunity to create 
a uniform influence standard for the circuits in subordinate bias lia-
bility cases. There are three standards adopted by the circuits—the 
strict, intermediate, and lenient standards. Only one circuit, the 
Fourth, has adopted the strict standard, which requires that the ac-
tual decisionmaker harbor discriminatory animus in order for an ad-
verse employment action to fall under the purview of subordinate bi-
as liability.128 This is far too restrictive as it essentially provides a 
blanket of immunity for employers against cat’s paw cases. The ma-
jority of circuits have embraced the lenient standard where any in-
fluence by a biased subordinate puts the employer in the realm  
of liability.129
 The intermediate causation standard finds a happy medium be-
tween the two extremes. It keeps in place some realistic level of cau-
sation given the dynamics of workplace environments while staying 
true to the policies behind antidiscrimination statutes.130 The Su-
preme Court should find the standard met when a biased subordi-
nate is the “motivating factor” for the adverse discrimination deci-
sion. This standard encourages employers to investigate reports of 
discrimination but also releases them from liability when the investi-
gation shows the employee should have been terminated regardless 
of a biased subordinate. Therefore, it is the only standard that bal-
ances the need to realistically limit the employer’s liability while still 
providing an avenue of redress for employees that have been wrongly 
terminated because of discrimination. 
 Subordinate bias liability is an essential theory that helps ensure 
workplaces are free of discrimination. However, without a uniform 
and workable standard, both employers and employees are disadvan-
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taged. The Supreme Court realizes that this is an area of law needing 
a uniform influence standard and will hopefully adopt the  
intermediate standard. 
